Assessing NAFTA - Part II: The Impact of NAFTA on Jobs, Wages, and Income Inequality by Hottenrott, Victoria & Blank, Stephen
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Faculty Working Papers Lubin School of Business
12-1-1998
Assessing NAFTA - Part II: The Impact of NAFTA
on Jobs, Wages, and Income Inequality
Victoria Hottenrott
University of Heidelberg
Stephen Blank
Pace University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lubinfaculty_workingpapers
Part of the International Business Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lubin School of Business at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact rracelis@pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hottenrott, Victoria and Blank, Stephen, "Assessing NAFTA - Part II: The Impact of NAFTA on Jobs, Wages, and Income Inequality"
(1998). Faculty Working Papers. Paper 36.
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lubinfaculty_workingpapers/36
        WORKING
    PAPERS
No. 178    December 1998
Assessing NAFTA - Part II
The Impact of NAFTA on Jobs, Wages, and
Income Inequality
by
Victoria Hottenrott, MBA
Member of the Alfred Weber Institut fur Sozial-
und Staatswiddenschaft at the University of
Heidelberg
and
Stephen Blank, Ph.D.
Director, Center for International Business
Development and Professor of Management
Lubin School of Business
ASSESSING NAFTA - Part II
THE IMPACT OF NAFTA ON JOBS, WAGES, AND INCOME
INEQUALITY
by
Victoria Hottenrott, M.B.A.
and
Stephen Blank, Ph.D.
Victoria Hottenrott received her M.B.A. from the Lubin School and is currently a
member of the Alfred Weber Institut fur Sozial- und Staatswiddenschaft at the
University of Heidelberg.
Stephen Blank is Director of the Center for International Business Development
and Professor of Management and International Business at the Lubin School of
Business, Pace University.
iPREFACE
This paper is one of three Lubin Working Papers on “ASSESSING NAFTA.”  These
papers are part of a wider project to assess the impact of NAFTA, which was carried out in the fall
and winter of 1997-98, for the Institute of International Trade and Investment in Japan.
Opinion about NAFTA in the U.S. is deeply divided. Critiques of NAFTA, particularly in
the U.S., reflect a reaction to excessive claims made earlier by NAFTA proponents. More
importantly, however, they reflect a growing anxiety about the economic and social impact of
trade on Americans — on their jobs, income, employment, and labor standards, for example.
Many Americans wonder if trade is responsible for stagnating wages, the decline of the share of
U.S. workers employed in manufacturing, and rising levels of income inequality in American
society. NAFTA has become a code-word for a host of fearful and contentious issues that have
little to do with the agreement, including globalization, economic dislocation, job insecurity, ethnic
paranoia, and even the future of the American middle class.
In this paper, we identify and assess recent research on the impact of NAFTA on trade, investment,
jobs, income, and the environment. Our review led to these conclusions:
· NAFTA is an important agreement and, together with the Uruguay Round accord, will exert
substantial influence over patterns of trade and investment in the future.
· However, to date, NAFTA has had only a modest direct impact on patterns of trade and investment
in North America. The same holds true for employment and wages. The NAFTA side agreements
have led to some change in environmental protection policy and in the protection and enhancement
of labor rights. These results are also modest, and it is simply too early to evaluate the impact of the
agreement on these areas.
· NAFTA, in our view, should be seen not as the beginning of the process of economic integration in
North America, but as a response to powerful forces of change that began in the mid-1980s. These
include changes in policy — particularly when the collapse of oil prices forced the Mexican and
Canadian governments to abandon import-substitution economic development strategies and
changes in markets — as rising levels of international competition forced firms to reduce excess
capacity and to rationalize operations in North America.
· Changes in corporate structure and organization have been a more powerful force in driving the
restructuring of the North American economy than NAFTA itself.
· NAFTA's greatest value has been its impact on government and business policies and decisions,
factors that cannot be measured in economic terms.  Most remarkable was Mexico's ability to
maintain its commitment to trade liberalization during the peso crisis of December 1994 by
reversing its traditional policy of closing markets by imposing import restrictions.
ii
One finding is both clear and ominous. Whereas four years ago the United States took the
leadership role in pressing for the implementation of a North American free trade agreement, today
support for the agreement and for the expansion of NAFTA is stronger in Canada and Mexico (even
after the peso crisis) than in the United States.
1INTRODUCTION
The issue that aroused the most controversy in the debate over NAFTA was its likely impact
on jobs and wages. As the author of a recent history of U.S. trade policy writes, “Although
NAFTA raised questions about environmental protection, immigration, drug interdiction, and
democracy, the bulk of the NAFTA debate focused on one issue—would NAFTA create or
destroy jobs?”1 A key reason for the controversy was the promise of job creation made by NAFTA
supporters and the threat of job loss made by NAFTA opponents. All kinds of numbers were and,
in fact, continue to be bruited about.2 U.S. jobs and wage levels remained the central concern in
the debate in the fall of 1998 over the impact of NAFTA and fast track authorization.
The situation was somewhat different in Canada and Mexico. Expectations here were more
focused on the overall development of their economies. Mexican leaders assumed that a “win-win”
situation would prevail, where the growth of Mexico’s consumer market would enable all the
NAFTA partners to expand their exports and gain new jobs; Canadians looked more at the
competitiveness of their economy in this new free trade environment. Nonetheless, there were
substantial fears in both countries that jobs would be lost. The restructuring of Canada's branch
plant economy inevitably involved substantial downsizing of industrial and managerial work forces,
and it helped produce levels of unemployment that were substantially higher than in the United
States. Many Mexicans feared that free trade with the U.S. would lead to a terrible loss of jobs in
their country’s inefficient agricultural sector, and possibly in manufacturing as well.
Employment - The Problem of Counting
Despite the centrality of these issues, NAFTA’s impact on jobs, wages, and income is
difficult to assess. Why?
It is difficult to track job creation or destruction due to a single, specific development.
Available numbers may not be effective measures of the impact on the labor markets. It is also
hard to relate macroeconomic and microeconomic findings. While many people have lost jobs in
the U.S. in recent years, and many have experienced economic adversity, overall, U.S.
employment is at record high levels. How can there be a significant problem of job loss, say some
economists, when unemployment is so low? Experts disagree sharply over patterns of change in
wages, incomes, and income inequality in the U.S. over the past 20 years. Anxiety and fear are
functions mainly of global change and of changing economic structures around the world, hardly
of NAFTA alone. Nonetheless, NAFTA became, and remains, a symbol of these wider concerns.
Ross Perot’s line about the “giant sucking sound of jobs going south” is endlessly reiterated in
these discussions.
Who is doing research on jobs and income? Little original research seems to have been
carried out by NAFTA opponents. We identified three organizations that have carried out serious
                                                 
1 Susan Ariel Aaron, Trade and the American Dream (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996) p. 140.
2 See Keith Bradsher, “Trade Pact Job Gains Discounted,” New York Times (22 February 1993), for an interesting
discussion of the problems these estimates created for two of the most respected and influential trade analysts.
2analyses of the impact of NAFTA on jobs: the Congressional Research Service (CRS)3, the North
American Integration and Development Center (NAID)4, and the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC)5. Their efforts were all undertaken at the same time, and they have drawn
extensively from each other’s findings. All three provided information and analysis for the
President’s three-year report on NAFTA.6
KEY ISSUES
The key battle between NAFTA supporters and opponents is over jobs and income
inequality.  Opponents claim that over 400,000 U.S. jobs were lost since 1993 because of NAFTA.
Concern focuses primarily on job losses in the U.S. that are related to increased trade. The
Economic Policy Institute (EPI) says that the increase in the trade deficit with its two NAFTA
partners to $39 billion in 1996 (an increase of 332 percent from 1993) was responsible for the loss
of 420,208 U.S. jobs. NAFTA's influence is seen as especially negative in the manufacturing
sector. The EPI claims that NAFTA is responsible for 38 percent of the decline in manufacturing
employment in America since 1989.
Proponents, however, argue that NAFTA has created tens or even hund eds of thousands of
new jobs. One supporter argues, for example, that because exports to Mexico and Canada grew by 10
percent in this period, it is reasonable to claim that 10 percent of the 4.84 million jobs created between
1993 and 1996 that were due to export growth can be accounted for by NAFTA-related exports.7 U.S.
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky claims that exports to Canada and Mexico support 2.3
million American jobs, up from 1.9 million before NAFTA came into effect.8
The most representative and wide-ranging critique of NAFTA after three years is found in
a report titled, The Failed Experiment: NAFTA at Three Years, prepared by six think tanks
concerned with trade, labor, and environmental issues. 9 The report of the “Group of Six” contends
in their Executive Summary that “NAFTA and globalization generally have changed the
                                                 
3 Mary Jane Bolle, Nafta Labor Side Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights and Fast-Track Debate,
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress 97-861-E (October 1997) and --- NAFTA: Estimates of
Job Effects and Industry Trade Trends After Three and One-Half Years, Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Report for Congress 96-176-E (Updated 9 September 1997).
4 Raul Hinojosa Ojeda et al., North American Integration Three Years After NAFTA: A Framework for Tracking,
Modeling and Internet Accessing the National and Regional Labor Market Impacts, North American Integration &
Development Center (NAID), University of California, Los Angeles (December 1996).
5 U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), The Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the
U.S. Economy and Industries: A Three-Year Review; Investigation No. 332-381 (Washington, D.C: ITC,
Publication 3945, June 1997).
6 Office of the Executive, Study on the Operation and Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(Washington, D.C. July 1997), cited as “the President’s report.”
7 Raymond Keating, “History’s hard road,” Journal of Commerce (30 September 1997) (by using the Commerce
Department’s estimate that every $1 billion increase in exports translates into 22,800 new jobs; see below, “The Debate
Over Standard Employment Multipliers”).
8 Quoted in Peter Morton, “U.S. report sings NAFTA’s praises” The Financial Post (12 July 1997).
9 Economic Policy Institute, Institute for Policy Studies, International Labor Rights Fund, Sierra Club, Public
Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, U.S. Business and Industrial Council Educational Foundation, The Faile
Experiment: NAFTA at Three Years (Wa hington DC: Economic Policy Institute, June 1997), cited as the Group of
Six report.
3composition of employment in America, stimulating the growth of lower paying services industries
and accelerating the deindustrialization of our economy.”10 Trade policy alone is seen to be
“responsible for 15 to 25 percent of the growth in the income gap that has occurred in the 1980s
and 1990s.”
Imports from low-wage countries are seen as the major cause of increasing wage inequality
in the United States, and Mexico is said to account for 26.7 percent of the increase of U.S. imports
from low-wage countries. The Report also underlines the impact of plant relocations from the U.S.
to Mexico on direct investment in general, and, as the main point of discussion, on the possibility
that firms will use a possible move as a threat, thereby preventing or blocking wage increases and
union organization, all of which drive the decline in real wages of blue collar workers.
Professor Kate Bronfenbrenner of Cornell says that over half the firms used those threats
to fight union organizing drives and, while in the bargaining process, 15 percent of firms actually
closed down parts or all of the operations. In its 1996 report “Nafta - The Myths and the
Realities,” the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) had already claimed that corporations were using
these tactics “to bring Third World wages and working conditions back home.”
The Debate Over Standard Employment Multipliers
Employment numbers based on “standard employment multipliers” have been widely used
in this debate. However, most analysts agree that these numbers have served mainly to cloud the
debate over NAFTA’s impact on jobs. These statistical correlations were utilized originally by
NAFTA proponents (and specifically the Commerce Department) to forecast likely job gains from
NAFTA. It was claimed that for every $1 billion increase in exports, 13,000 (or more, for the
number seems to have increased over time) jobs would be created.11 Multiplying this figure by the
growth in U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico in 1994-96 ($47.5 billion) suggests that about
618,000 new jobs were created in the U.S. economy in this period by new exports to our NAFTA
partners. Therefore, this would represent approximately 7 percent of the 8.8 million jobs created in
the U.S. economy over the same time.
Opponents of NAFTA contend that if increases in exports correlate with new jobs, then
increases in imports should correlate with lost jobs. They argue that the substantial and increasing
trade deficit the U.S. is now running with its NAFTA partners has resulted in substantial job losses
— that is, so many jobs lost for each $1 billion of deficit.
Most analysts doubt the validity of this correlation. If it is, at best, indicative with regard to
exports, it seems useless with regard to imports. Mary Jane Bolle, an economist with the
Congressional Research Service (CRS), observes that “trade deficits cannot be used to measure
net job losses because, as economists point out, there are no net job losses as long as output and
employment continue to rise. New imports are just added to domestic output, and not substituted
for it. Trade deficits, therefore, do not reflect aggregate jobs lost, but rather, arguably, at most,
                                                 
10 Executive Summary, Group of Six.
11 Mary Jane Bolle, “NAFTA: Estimates of Job Effects and Industry Trade Trends After Three and One-Half Years”
CRS Report for Congress, 96-176 E (Updated 9 September 1997, p. 2).
4some job gains foregone (which have no identifiable victims) in sectors affected by trade.... This is
not to say the job losses do not exist. They are very real, and perhaps more accurately counted
directly and tallied up by industry.”12
Others agree. The NAID, for example, observes that “despite the lack of ongoing research,
there has nevertheless recently been much speculation in the press about the impact on U.S.
employment due to NAFTA trade liberalization and the Mexican peso crisis. The recent round of
speculations, however, have been based on estimations that have tended to reproduce many of the
same errors which were typically found during the NAFTA debate on both sides of the issue.”13
Opinion polls indicate that the public in NAFTA countries is still very confused about the
employment impacts of NAFTA and about which country has benefited more from the agreement.
The NAID again comments: “Most of the recent round of estimates … are still at best based on
partial information from one or another source, extrapolated by very imprecise or faulty
methodologies. Rarely have recent estimates clearly presented the data and methodologies which
underlie their conclusions.”14 Raul Hinojosa Ojeda (who headed the NAID investigation) observes
that the aim of their investigation was “to lower the rhetoric on both sides of the debate. NAFTA
is neither a panacea nor is it a creator of a giant sucking sound.”15
MEASURES AND ANALYSES
Are There Any Good Numbers Out There?
Several groups have attempted to measure the effects of increased trade on employment
and wages. The findings of three of them — the NAFTA-Transitional Adjustment Assistance
(TAA) Program, the North American Integration and Development (NAID) Center, and the
International Trade Commission (ITC) — will be reviewed in the following section.
The NAFTA-TAA Program
The International Trade Commission’s report states that “the linkage between trade policy
and labor market effects is less direct than the link between the trade agreement and a single
bilateral trade flow.”16 Changes in trade policy affect the quantities and prices of traded goods,
which then affect the labor force that produces those goods. As a result, labor market findings are
less conclusive than the findings reported with respect to trade flows. The major difficulty besides
that of figuring out a relation between trade flows and employment numbers is seen to be that of
isolating the data on NAFTA’s impact from other factors, such as the peso crisis. Bolle cla ms that
                                                 
12 Mary Jane Bolle, op cit.
13 Also quoted from NAID (footnote 4, p. 7): Bob Herbert [1994], for example, used an estimate of “one million jobs
lost due to NAFTA” without any critical examination of its source. The Los Angeles Times ha  reported without
critical examination the California Trade and Commerce Agency’s regular claim that “Nafta is clearly benefit ing
California’s economy...” which is based solely on export figures without ever mentioning imports. (LAT 6-27-
96.html).
14 Raul Hinojosa Ojeda et al, pp. 7-8.
15 “Tracking NAFTA,” Mexico Business (March 1997), pp. 26-28.
16 U.S. International Trade Commission, pp. 4-14.
5because it is virtually impossible to discern job effects from NAFTA, the documentation is really
about job effects since NAFTA.
One source of information, however, is specifically linked to NAFTA—data collected by
the Department of Labor on how many workers have been certified under the NAFTA Transitional
Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA-TAA) Program.17 The certification identifies those who are
eligible for training or income replacement benefits because imports from our NAFTA partners
“contributed importantly” to their job loss, or because their plant relocated to Mexico or
Canada.”18 The TAA represents the closest approach to a direc measurement of job losses due to
NAFTA.  After three and a half years (Jan 1994-June 1997) the Department of Labor certified
133,052 job losers from 1,108 plants under the NAFTA-TAA Program. In the TAA registration
period between 1993 and 1995, this represented approximately 2.4 percent of the total number of
U.S. workers dislocated.19
What about NAFTA’s impact on absolute levels of employment? The more detailed
analyses of NAFTA’s impact on jobs have focused on the manufacturing sector, which accounts
for 20 percent of the non-farming labor force and for nearly 90 percent of all the certified NAFTA-
TAA workers.20 However, manufactured goods account only for a dwindling percentage of the
United States’ consumption.21 CRS results show that the extent to which NAFTA is exacerbating
the decline in absolute employment in affected industries is low. An absolute decline in
employment occurred in only seven of 18 manufacturing industries that showed job losses due to
NAFTA. In only one of those seven industries, the paper industry, did NAFTA account for a
considerable share of lost jobs (33 percent). Oth r job losses were presumably due to productivity
gains or non-NAFTA related declines in output.22 Overall, between 1993 and 1996, manufacturing
employment grew by 382,000 jobs, or about 2 percent, and has more than made up for NAFTA
job losses.
The NAID, in its very detailed analysis and sorting (by sectors, regions, effects etc.) of the
NAFTA-TAA numbers, also found that the job losses did not significantly affect the majority of
the 20 SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) categories reviewed. Twelve of them were actually
found to be growing (“though admittedly out of recession, but nevertheless, growing”).23 NAFTA-
TAA registered job losses appeared to be a significant contributor to nationwide net job losses
only in the apparel (22.8 percent) and textile industries (21.7 percent), and the leather industry
(11.2 percent), which, however, is rather small and long-declining.
Even in these more rigorous analyses, the data are criticized. However closely related these
counted losses are to NAFTA effects, all sides agree that the numbers probably do not account for
all of the layoffs, since not everybody files for the offered help. NAFTA supporters say that this is
                                                 
17 Hinojosa Ojeda et al, p. 53 (the “only official recording system of NAFTA impacts”).
18 Mary Jane Bolle, CRS Report for Congress 96-176-E (Updated 9 September 1997), p. 4.
19 ITC, pp. 3-8.
20 Hinojosa Ojeda et al., p. 53.
21 Gary Burtless et al., G obaphobia: Confronting Fears About Open Trade (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, The Progressive Policy Institute, The Twentieth Century Fund: 1998), p. 52.
22 See also Gary Burtless et al., p. 53.
23 Raul Hinojosa Ojeda et al., p. 54.
6because most workers found another job and, therefore, did not bother applying. Opponents
disagree and maintain that the program is not well known, and that ma y workers who have lost
their jobs have been discouraged by the paperwork and bureaucracy. As a result, they do not claim
benefits and often settle for lower paying jobs.
The TAA numbers may just as well overstate the actual number of NAFTA-impacted
workers, since the program is not tied to NAFTA provisions per se, but rather to increases in
imports from, or shifts in production to, NAFTA partners. The NAID criticizes the potential
misuse of these numbers as well and points out the relevant inadequacies in great detail. However,
it sees the NAFTA-TAA register as a relevant source of information if used appropriately and,
therefore, we have integrated it in its own analysis.
The NAID Analysis
The NAID’s critique of the sole use of NAFTA-TAA numbers as an indicator for
NAFTA’s impact on employment is a more detailed one. By separating the aggregate numbers and
cases into different schemata, it points out that a great majority of the cases certified through the
NAFTA-TAA come from plant relocations (or production shifts—about 58 percent of all
certifications):
The NAFTA-TAA certification method has the virtue of being based on empirically
reported incidences of employment dislocations, but is limited by the fact that this
data is based on self-reporting by workers and firms. This method is judged to be
more accurate for large firms involved in the highly visible process of plant
movements to other NAFTA countries. This method is seen as much less reliable
as a measure of import penetration, particularly in smaller firms…24
The NAID checked possible relations between NAFTA-TAA numbers and trends and the
trade changes since the implementation of NAFTA. However, it did not find any correlation. “This
illustrates that NAFTA-TAA may not be picking up some impacts.”  Therefore, to be able to
estimate the impact of imports — or generally the changes in trade patterns — on employment, the
NAID developed a new model, the “NAID-Armington Direct Employment Impact Estimation
Method.”
Because imports do not always replace domestic production, the NAID uses Armington
elasticities in a partial equilibrium model that accounts for the degree of complem ntarity of
imports and domestic goods. In addition, the model tries to integrate the relevance of the
complementarity of U.S. and Mexican production by looking not only at the level of imports and
exports, but more specifically by distinguishing between intermediate and final products, and
therefore accounting for the high level of re-imports of formerly exported intermediary products.
This model certainly represents a more accurate approach to assess dimensions of trade
flows, but as the NAID itself points out, it can only account for direct impacts on a sector l level.
                                                 
24 Raul Hinojosa Ojeda et al., p. 52.
7The indirect effects would have to be investigated at an aggregate level.25 Also, the partial
equilibrium analysis is not to be seen as a complete gauge of the impact of plant relocations, which
makes the NAID-Armington method and the NAFTA-TAA methodology complementary
measures of the trade and investment impacts of North American Integration.
Using both methods, the NAID’s overall findings are:26
· The overall positive or negative employment impacts of U.S.-Mexico trade have not been
significantly affected by the liberalization of tariffs due to NAFTA.
· The net employment impacts due to NAFTA tariff liberalization have been slightly positive,
representing a very small share of new jobs being supported by exports to (or put at risk of
displacement through imports from) Mexico.
· The overall net U.S. employment impacts since the NAFTA implementation (1994-96) have
also been slightly positive, even taking into account the large impact of the peso crisis of 1995.
· Negative employment impacts related to imports have actually declined when comparing pre-
and post-NAFTA periods, due primarily to steep annual declines in labor intensity of U.S.
manufacturing.
· The most important negative impact on employment has been the decline in U.S. exports due
to the Mexican peso crisis, not the liberalization of tariffs due to NAFTA.
These findings are basically congruent with those of the other assessments by organizations
that favor NAFTA. But a rather new perspective to the assessment of the issue is brought up by
this analysis:
· Though unfortunately not central to the NAFTA debates, the real issue with respect to U.S.
employment levels concerns the development of policies that can achieve sustainable growth in
Mexico. While the “Mexican Rescue Package“ appears to have been crucial in averting another
deep collapse, it is by no means certain that sustainable growth has been assured.27
The NAID stresses that other developments that affect U.S. exports to Mexico are much
more important for the American labor market than the increase in competitive imports. “As in the
early 1980s, the principal danger to jobs was not the pattern of trade, but the inability to sustain a
stable macroeconomic environment between the United States and Mexico.”
The NAID’s very modest bottom line is that 2,990 net jobs were created by NAFTA.
The ITC Analysis
                                                 
25 Furthermore, the effects stemming from trade diversion are not fully captured by the new model, which is one of
the reasons the NAID itself claims that this model still has a tendency to overstate the impacts.
26 Raul Hinojosa Ojeda et al., p. 12.
27 Raul Hinojosa Ojeda et al., p. 13.
8The ITC analysis confirms the NAID findings in both its quantitative and qualitative
analyses. The ITC’s detailed industry level and sector-by-sector analyses represent a major
contribution to more reliable and transparent information especially with respect to the trade
flows. (See CFAR Working Paper  No. 177, the first in this Series.) At this point, as we examine
the impact of NAFTA on employment and wages, we will not elaborate on the techniques or
methodologies used, but, in an attempt to embrace the findings of the major substantial research
available, will restrict ourselves to a brief outline of the major results of the quantitative as well as
the qualitative analysis.
Quantitative analysis. These industry level effects are based on an analysis of 120 selected
4-digit SIC categories. Because labor effects can occur through changes in employment or
earnings, these variables were examined separately. Furthermore, specific attempts were made to
separate the effects of NAFTA from changes due to typical business cycle shifts.28 The principal
finding reported is that relatively few U.S. industries (representing less than 4 percent of the non-
farm labor force, or less than 17 percent of the manufacturing labor force) show evidence of
having been affected, either positively or negatively, by NAFTA in its first three years. The ITC
findings, therefore, support the argument that NAFTA has had no statistically significant effect on
the U.S. manufacturing labor force as a whole.
Among those industries with “significant NAFTA effects,” hours worked were most often
found to be positively related to NAFTA, while earnings were more often found to be negatively
related.
Qualitative analysis. In its qualitative (sector-by-sector) analysis, the ITC found that
NAFTA had a negligible effect on 59 of the 68 sectors examined. With regard to employment,
negligible impacts were found in 66 of the 68 sectors.29 In only one sector—apparel—did NAFTA
show significant impact on U.S. wage levels. There, imports attributable to NAFTA shifted the
composition of employment to higher-wage fabric cutting jobs, and, overall, wages increased by
12 percent in the U.S. apparel sector from 1993-96.30
 
The lack of data prevented the ITC from investigating the impact of NAFTA on
productivity in its quantitative analysis. In its qualitative analysis, the ITC was able to detect
productivity gains (between 3 and 10 percent from 1993 to 1995) in all of the sectors where
NAFTA had significantly affected exports or imports.31
Conclusions On Jobs
                                                 
28 ITC, pp. 4-14.
29 ITC, Executive Summary, pp. xxiii, xxiv. The imports from Mexico in these two sectors (footwear and apparel)
appear to have largely displaced imports from other countries. And those imports from Mexico on average have
higher U.S. content than imports of these products from Asian and other countries! (ITC findings mentioned in
President’s report, p. 41).
30 As cited in President’s report, p. 42.
31 Ibid.
9The conclusion drawn from all these analyses is that NAFTA has had no significant
aggregate impact on jobs. All agree that the U.S. labor force has been at virtually full employment
for almost the entire duration of NAFTA. In April 1997, the U.S. unemployment rate stood at 4.9
percent, the lowest level in 24 years. This is why, for example, economists such as B. L. Weinstein
at the Center for Economic Development and Research at the University of Texas in Denton even
see a benefit in imports (especially in intra-firm trade). This is because imports may provide a relief
valve against bottlenecks that give rise to inflationary pressures.32 This ugg sts why the impact of
NAFTA on job dislocation and employment creation should be analyzed at the sectoral level.
Sydney Weintraub,33 from the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that the
labor market effects of NAFTA is an issue of minor significance in an overall evaluation of the
Agreement, given the current low level of unemployment in the United States and the rapid rate of
job creation. The implication is that the Agreement has had no real discernible effect on aggregate
jobs in the economy, certainly not in a negative direction.34 He does not offer his own empirical
work, but cites others' findings—for example, the NAID report and the reports of the
Congressional Research Service.
A new book entitled Globaphobia, Confronting Fears About Open Trade, rele s d by the
Brookings Institution, the Progressive Policy Institute, and the Twentieth Century Fund,
underlines that “trade is not about generating more or fewer jobs, but generating better jobs and a
higher national standard of living.”35
Similarly, Raul Hinojosa argues that jobs gain/loss accounting methodologies should not be
used in most cases to evaluate the relative benefits of trade, although these methodologies should
be central to our understanding of the adjustment costs of the impacts of trade:
In evaluating the relative benefits of trade, it is much more important to focus on
understanding the long-term dynamic impacts on productivity growth and overall
welfare gains, not merely on the short-term employment effects. Accurately
identifying employment displacement risks, however, is very important to assist
workers and communities take adequate steps to prepare for a positive adjustment.
Failure to identify and address adjustment risk will inevitably generate exaggerated
political opposition to trade liberalization, in some cases based on ignorance and
fear, and in some cases based on the legitimate defense of uncompensated
individual costs which are incurred on behalf of the overall societal welfare.36
                                                 
32 Quoted in U.S: News and World Report (7 July 1997), p. 59.
33 Sidney Weintraub, NAFTA at Three (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997).
34 “Job creation and loss are overwhelmingly a function of conditions in the U.S. economy. Foreign trade with a
single country is marginal in this respect. Macroeconomic policy - monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Board,
the management of fiscal policy, and shifts in the value of dollar in relation to other currencies - is much more
significant than trade outcomes, particularly with a single country like Mexico, in determining domestic
employment.” Sidney Weintraub, Nafta at Three, p. 12.
35 Gary Burtless et al., p. 45.
36 Raul Hinojosa Ojeda et al., p. 15.
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Weintraub and others, when trying to identify and measure the effect of NAFTA on income
and jobs, focus on how NAFTA creates institutional frames—such as the side agreements on labor
and on environmental cooperation (NAALC & NAAEC), institutions that seek to reduce the
impact of change on a global scale of which NAFTA is only part. In this view, Transitional
Adjustment Assistance is one prominent example of how sect ral effects can be relieved.
Wages and Income Distribution
The NAID study has been questioned because it w s sponsored by the U.S. government.
The NAID report also failed to deal with the more delicate question as to how wages and income
distribution are being affected by the changes in trade patterns. One economist at the AFL-CIO,
for example, says that most benefits from NAFTA go to corporate elites.37
Raul Hinojosa did, however, discuss these issues in an interview published in Mexico
Business.38 “We did a little exercise that we didn’t include,” he said. The average wage in sectors
(in the U.S.) in which imports from Mexico have increased is actually higher than the average
wage in sectors where the U.S. exports to Mexico have risen. This differs from wider experience,
where average wages in export-oriented jobs is higher than average wages in import-oriented jobs.
Hinojosa believes this is because the imports from Mexico are in the lower-paid segments of the
production process of a relatively higher paying sector. He sees this as an indicator of a very tight
and complex industrial interdependence between Mexico and the U.S., which has been a trend of
the last 15 years, not one that originated with NAFTA.
This could be good or it could be bad, depending on the evolution of Mexican
wages and productivity. If Mexico remains a simple low-wage manufacturer with
chronic crises that prevent an increase in real wages, then this will be bad for the
U.S. It will prevent Mexico from expanding its potential as a market for U.S.
products. And it will prevent Mexican wages and productivity from rising in a way
that would better complement the ability of North America to become more
competitive. If you’ve got a low-wage option sitting there locked into an industrial
structure, you’re not necessarily going to move toward higher technology
investments.
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Hinojosa counters Ross Perot’s giant sucking sound prediction caused by better paying jobs
being lost to Mexico leaving lower wage jobs behind, saying that a detailed analysis permits one to
see that the “types of jobs that go, are the more labor-intensive, lower-skilled, lower-paid.”
The ITC’s comment on the quality of the newly created jobs and growing inequality in
income distribution is based on the Council of Economic Advisors’ (CEA) assessment that most of
the new jobs created in the 1990s are “good” jobs.39 The CEA analysis adds that the number of
lower-paying jobs also increased and that employment in the middle of the earnings distribution
fell. The CEA further noted that “a disproportionate share” of employment growth in the current
expansion is in the service sector. The CEA reported that during the February 1994-February 1996
period, managerial and professional jobs were the main contributor to net increases in services
employment. Meanwhile, gains in real household income during the 1993-95 period were greater,
in percentage terms, for the lowest-income households.
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN COMPETITION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
NAFTA discussions are a subset of much wider arguments now underway on the impact of
foreign competition and international trade on American jobs, wages, and our standard of living.
Globalization and technological advances in communications and transportation are restructuring
not only how but also where economic activities are carried on. The impact of foreign competition
and international trade (especially with developing countries) on American standards of living,
jobs, and wages is another widely felt source of anxiety today.
One concern has to do with the impact of foreign competition on U.S. jobs. As Paul
Krugman and Robert Lawrence have observed, "the conventional wisdom holds that foreign
competition has eroded the U.S. manufacturing base, washing out the high-paying jobs that a
strong manufacturing sector provides. More broadly, the argument goes, Americans' real income
has lagged as a result of the inability of many U.S. firms to sell in world markets. And because
imports increasingly come from Third World countries with their huge reserves of unskilled labor,
the heaviest burden of this foreign competition has ostensibly fallen on less educated American
workers."40
Income inequality between richer and poorer nations increased over most of the past
century. It has been estimated that average income per capita in the richer countries soared from
11 times that of the poorest in 1870 to 52 times by 1985, and it is likely to be greater still today.
Concern is growing, however, that this trend is now being reversed. The developing
nations contain a huge army of unskilled workers. Indeed, some 40 percent of the world's labor
supply consist of peasants whose average income is less than $1600 a year. Unskilled workers in
the richer countries (who make up 8 percent of the world's labor supply) earn an average of
$17,000 a year. There is strong temptation, it is assumed, for employers to substitute the lower for
the higher-paid unskilled workers by moving production to poorer countries.
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40 Paul Krugman and Robert Z. Lawrence, “Trade, Jobs and Wages,” Scientific American (April 1994).
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Some statistics seem to support this view. Imports from developing countries now
comprise one-third of all U.S. imports, as compared to 14 percent in 1970, and manufactured
goods now make up about half of all imports from developing countries, compared to 5 percent in
1955.41
Increasing imports from developing and newly industrializing countries are often blamed
for rising levels of unemployment in Western Europe and stagnating wages in the U.S. Some
contend that unless developed nations are protected against "social dumping," workers in these
countries will have to settle for third-world working conditions and levels of pay or high levels of
unemployment. Some observers, Professor Adrian Wood for example, claim that trade has
reduced the demand for unskilled labor in rich countries by about one-quarter, which is more than
enough to explain the increased wage inequality in the U.S. and the rise of unemployment in
Europe.42
Is the decline in the share of U.S. workers employed in manufacturing and the share of
U.S. output accounted for by value added in manufacturing the result of rising imports?
From 1970 to 1990, imports rose from 11.4 percent to 38.2 percent of the manufacturing
contribution to U.S. GDP. However, manufacturing exports also rose dramatically in the same
period, from 12.6 percent to 31 percent of value added. Many manufacturing firms may have laid
off workers in the face of competition from abroad, but others have added workers to produce for
expanding export markets.
Krugman and Lawrence conclude: “If trade in manufactured goods had been balanced from
1970 to 1990, the downward trend in the size of the manufacturing sector would not have been as
steep as it actually was, but most of the deindustrialization would still have taken place. Between
1970 and 1990 manufacturing declined from 25.0 to 18.4 percent of GDP; with balanced trade, the
decline would have been from 24.9 to 19.2 percent, about 86 percent as large.”
The more powerful reason for the decline in the share of manufacturing in U.S. GDP is that
the composition of domestic spending has shifted away from manufactured goods. In 1970, U.S.
residents spent 46 percent of their outlays on goods (manufactured, grown, or mined) and 54
percent on services and construction. By 1991, the shares were 40.7 percent and 59.3 percent
respectively, as people began spending comparatively more on, for example, health care, travel,
entertainment, legal services, and fast food. The reason is that goods have become relatively
cheaper, primarily because productivity in manufacturing has grown much faster than in services,
which is passed on in lower consumer prices.
Ironically, the conventional wisdom here has things almost exactly backward.
Policymakers often ascribe the declining share of industrial employment to a lack of manufacturing
competitiveness brought on by inadequate productivity growth. In fact, the shrinkage is largely the
result of high productivity growth, at least as compared with the service sector. The concern that
                                                 
41 See Stephanie Flanders and Martin Wolf, “Haunted by the Trade Spectre,”Financial Times (24 July 1995).
42 See Adrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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industrial workers would lose their jobs because of automation is closer to the truth than the
preoccupation with a presumed loss of manufacturing because of foreign competition.
If foreign competition is neither the main villain in the decline of manufacturing nor the
root cause of stagnating wages, has it not at least worsened the lot of unskilled labor? Has the
increasing integration of the global economy pushed down the real wages of less-educated and
less-skilled American workers? Percy Ba nevik, CEO of ABB Asea Brown Boveri, observed a
couple of years ago that "it is a fallacy to think that industry will increase employment overall in
the Western world..." He foresees "a massive move from the Western world." Jobs, Barnevik says,
will shift to Asia and Eastern Europe: "Western European and American employment will just
shrink...like farming at the turn of the century."43
This is where the "factor price equalization" theory is supposed to kick in. This theory
states that as a richer country trades with a poorer country, the richer one imports labor intensive
products and exports products that demand more highly skilled workers. As the demand for
unskilled workers falls, the price they can command falls as well, and, as this occurs, employers
will seek to substitute lower-skilled, lower-paid workers for more highly skilled labor.
This kind of analysis typically leaves out productivity differentials. Labor costs are much
less frequently the key factor in locational decision. Final output cost is the determining factor.
Labor costs in Mexico might be lower than in the U.S., but lower productivity, inadequate
infrastructure, and poor work habits, for example, can lift final output costs higher than in
countries where workers receive much better pay. Relocation of jobs will take place not just when
labor prices are lower, but when final output costs are lower.
In most manufacturing industries, the labor share of the final cost is falling, which makes
labor costs increasingly less relevant to location issues. Indeed, some fear that work that has been
carried on in low-skill, low-wage nations may now be migrating back to more developed countries
as capital intensive production.
Moreover, the U.S. continues to purchase much more from other advanced countries,
whose workers have similar skills and wages, than from poorer countries. Increasing low-wage
competition from trade with developing countries is offset by the rise in wages and skill levels
among our traditional trading partners. Data show that U.S. firms continue to invest more and
create more jobs in higher-wage countries, such as Canada and the nations of Western Europe,
than in low-wage countries.
Has global integration created a link between the rising inequality in rich countries and the
rising levels of trade with poorer countries?
This link doesn't fit well into the factor-price equalization theory, which says that the wages
of the unskilled in rich countries will fall only if the relative prices of the goods that use the
unskilled labor also fall. In addition, according to the theory, such a decline in the price of
unskilled labor should encourage companies to substitute unskilled workers for more expensive
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higher-skilled employees. Neither of these has taken place. What this all provides is even stronger
grounds for believing that technological change is the main reason for the decline in the demand
for unskilled workers in high-income countries.44
Another investigation of the relationship between world trade and worsening income
inequality arrives at the same conclusion. Gary Burtless, from the Brookings Institution, asks if
trade harms unskilled U.S. workers.45 H  finds that inequality is growing in both the most and the
least trade-affected industries at about the same rate.
Over the past quarter century, the nation has seen a dramatic shift in the pattern of
demand for workers with different levels of skill. Job opportunities for the less-
skilled have shrunk, and relative wages for unskilled and semiskilled workers have
plunged. But these trends are not confined to the traded-goods sector. They are
also apparent in industries, such as construction and retail trade, where
international trade is a minor concern. International trade, it seems, has not been
the decisive factor in the trend toward greater earnings inequality.
Like Burtless, Krugman and Lawrence conclude that "the sources of U.S. difficulties are
overwhelmingly domestic, and the nation's plight would be much the same even if world markets
had not become more integrated."
The share of manufacturing in GDP is declining because people are buying
relatively fewer goods; manufacturing employment is falling because companies are
replacing workers with machines and making more efficient use of those they
retain. Wages have stagnated because the rate of productivity growth in the
economy as a whole has slowed, and less skilled workers in particular are suffering
because a high-technology economy has less and less demand for their services.
Our trade with the rest of the world plays at best a small role in each case.
This is not to say that we have no reason to be concerned at all over the impact of
globalization.
New problems may be brewing in some high-skilled sectors of the economy. Highly skilled
software programmers in India, for example, who are equipped with the latest computers and
telecommunications equipment, but who work for much less than software programmers in New
York, might possess a competitive advantage. Given appropriate communications capacity, it
doesn't matter very much if programmers are down the hall, in another state or, for that matter, in
India.
Here, too, the problem may look worse than it is. In software programming in particular,
the shortfall in supply domestically may well have encouraged employers to look abroad.
Moreover, Indian programmers' compensation will tend to rise as demand for their services and
the quality of their work increases. Furthermore, some high-tech operations will prefer to have
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their programmers clustered closely around them, to encourage the formation of a critical mass of
intellect and innovation. Finally, it is difficult to think of too many industries in which this kind of
situation applies.
What the example of Indian software programmers illustrates is not really so much the
relationship between industrial and developing countries, but the rapidly increasing flexibility of
business organizations. Companies no longer need even to think about shifting some of their
operations abroad. Instead, they can outsource a far broader array of their business activities. They
can worry much less about bricks and mortar, full-time employees, or relationships that constrain
managerial autonomy.
THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION
Side agreements on labor and the environment were absolutely critical to the ratification of
NAFTA. The U.S. Congress, supported by many organizations in all three countries, agreed to
pass the NAFTA Agreement only after two “side deals” were worked out to help correct
perceived abuses to labor and the environment in Mexico.
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), was designed to
cushion anticipated negative effects from the agreement on employment, without giving up the
overall welfare effects expected from an increase in trade. The NAACL focuses on regulating
transitional adjustment assistance and provides a legal framework to assure a certain standard of
labor conditions and the enforcement of labor rights.
What is the NAALC?
Mary Jane Bolle of the Congressional Research Service observes that “the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), between the United States, Mexico, and Canada, is the first
trade agreement ever linked to worker rights provisions in a major way.” 46 The “side agreement”
on labor cooperation—the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)—went
into effect with NAFTA on January 1, 1994. The NAALC is “broad” in that the NAFTA
signatories agree to enforce their own labor laws and standards while promoting 11 worker rights
principles. Figure I/1 displays these principles and the extent of their enforceability.
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Figure I/1 NAALC’s Labor Principles
Group and Principles Extent of Enforceability
Group I
1.  Freedom of association and protection of
the right to organize
Enforceable by discussion of the National
Administrative Offices, Secretariat, and
Ministerial Council
2. The right to bargain collectively
3. The right to strike
Group II
1. Prohibition of forced labor Enforceable by discussion as indicated for
Group I plus evaluation by an Evaluation
Committee of Experts
2. Minimum employment standards
    pertaining to overtime pay
3. Elimination of employment
    discrimination
4. Equal pay for men and women
5. Compensation in cases of
    occupational injuries and illnesses
6. Protection of migrant workers
Group III
1. Labor protection for children and young
Persons
Enforceable by discussion as for Group I,
evaluation as for Group II, and sanctions
determined by an Arbitral Panel
2. Minimum employment standards
    pertaining to minimum wages
3. Prevention of occupational injuries
    and illnesses
The key “weakness” of the NAALC lies in the enforceability of these principles. “The side
accord on labor is careful to list guiding principles that the Parties are committed to promote,
albeit subject to each Party’s domestic law, but these are guiding principles only, not intended to
establish common minimum standards for a Party’s domestic law.” 47 Sanctions as an enforcement
tool against countries that do not self-enforce are applicable to only three of the 11 labor principles
— minimum wages, child labor, and occupational safety and health. Those principles in Group I
are subject only to discussions among NAALC partners and those in Group II may be addressed,
in addition, by recommendations from an outside committee of experts. The road to sanctions
against a country that does not enforce its own laws is a long one and may take more than two
years when all procedures specified by the NAALC are followed. Sanctions in any case are not
applicable to three basic rights — the right to organize, bargain collectively, and strike.
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The NAALC provides for the creation of a Commission on Labor Cooperation (CLC) with
a three-part structure (Figure I/2).
Figure I/2 Administrative Structure Set Up by NAALC
This structure includes a Ministerial Council consisting of the labor ministers of Mexico,
Canada, and the United States; a 15-person Secretariat to provide technical advice to the council
and report on labor-law issues and the status of pending matters; and a National Administrative
Office (NAO) for each country to serve as the point of contact between the commission and each
government.48
The very existence of a labor side agreement is groundbreaking in the history of trade
agreements. It can, as Mary Jane Bolles observes, be viewed from four perspectives:
· It is an accomplishment to some in that it promotes international engagement in labor
rights and standards on an unprecedented scale. It is a first acknowledgment that workers
making goods for export are intimately connected with the products that are traded;
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· It falls short of the original plan to others in that many feel that it does not go far enough to
protect workers, particularly in enforcement;
· It is a signal of alarm to a third group in that the NAALC impinges on the freedom of
multinational corporations to bring goods to the consumer at the lowest cost and it
deprives developing countries of possible competitive advantage; and
· It is considered unnecessary by a fourth group in that the International Labour
Organization is mandated to deal with these issues.
The real key to uncertainty lies in the fact that the NAALC “can be viewed as a vehicle that
at the same time both promotes worker rights and preserves sovereignty. Herein lies another area
of controversy.”49
The impact of the NAALC in so short a period can only be modest. To date, only six c s s
have been reviewed by national panels, five in Mexico and one in the U.S. All have restricted
themselves to fact-finding.
Despite this slow start, two results seem to be evident. First, at least in one case, NAALC
has encouraged Mexico to begin enforcing its own labor law permitting workers the right to
organize and bargain collectively. Under the NAALC eight submissions were made — six alleged
Mexico’s failure to enforce its own law relating to the right of workers to organize into unions.
The sixth of these led to union registration by an independent organization. Some observers think
that the repetitive pattern of submissions on this subject is why Mexico eventually granted union
status to workers from one company.50
The second result has been “the creation of a labor communications superhighway” (in the
words of Mary Jane Bolle) that connects the three NAFTA partners. “In its first three years,
NAALC has fostered studies comparing the labor laws of the three countries, nurtured the
development of a standardized system of labor market indicators, and been responsible for studies
comparing productivity levels and wage rates.”
Another positive but indirect impact of NAFTA and the NAALC is increased pressure on
Mexico’s trade unions. Most unions in Mexico are established by the state within the CTM, the
Confederation of Mexican workers, and workers are employed only if they join these unions.
Other independent unions have been forbidden. Recently, labor has begun to forge its own cross-
border alliances, with support from unions and labor federations in Canada and the U.S. In the
past, Mexicans resisted help from the North, and the North wasn’t really interested either. Now,
however, “the trade agreement had made clear not only to labor bureaucrats but to grass-roots
unionists all across the continent how working together to improve wages and conditions in
Mexico also would benefit workers north of the border by reducing the incentive for corporations
to move factories south.”51
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There are, of course, many criticisms of the NAALC. A Canadian group argues that at
best, the NAALC did little more than create an apparatus for holding public meetings, which are
often ignored by employers since the law itself provides no means to punish abuses. The
recommendation of “Ministerial consultations,” a closed-door conference among government
officials, is the strongest remedy offered workers under the NAALC, with no guarantee that any
issue must be resolved.52 Moreover, say other critics, when cases were “won” by Mexican
workers, that meant holding a piece of paper in their hand that says you were right, but with no
resulting reinstatement of workers — “not a single employer was sanctioned, no union ever
recognized.”53
Senator Richard Gephardt and many others say that NAFTA’s environmental and labor
provisions should be linked to provisions on investment and trade and be p rt of the core
agreement rather than side agreements. Gephardt notes that Mexico already has a lot of the
required laws within its constitution and, therefore, sees the problem more in Mexico’s
enforcement.54 Moreover, countries have to enforce only their own laws. The NAALC cannot stop
any government from changing its own labor law and driving down standards. In federal systems
— like those of all three partners — the national government could sign the agreement and try to
enforce it, but they could find that the final responsibility rests in the hands of states or provinces.
“The extent of Canada’s obligations are limited by its division of powers. While the federal
government is the signatory, from a constitutional perspective, it cannot interfere in matters
properly provincial. In the result, Canada is only a qualified signatory to the side accord applicable
to as many of its provinces as possible and Canada is to set out in a separate declaration to the
other Parties a list of any provinces for which Canada is to be bound.”55 (This is ot likely, the
authors remind us, at least in the U.S. and Canada, where the NAALC principles have long been
part of “the fabric of federal and provincial labor and employment laws in Canada” and the U.S.).
More could be done, some lawyers suggest.56 The Commission on Labor Cooperation
could play a constructive role by encouraging cooperative activity among the three NAFTA
partners on many policy issues. The U.S. NAO has sponsored Occupational Safety and Health Act
training seminars in specific industries, set up training programs, and sponsored workshops. Even
more usefully, it has pushed to harmonize statistics in NAFTA. “But more is possible, especially in
the legal area, for it is abundantly clear that none of the three countries really understand the
others’ legal cultures. It would be unfortunate if these cooperative efforts were derailed because of
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a concerted effort to replay the NAFTA wars through the Commission on Labor Cooperation. The
NAO report process was never meant to be a labor-rights court.”
In the debate over fast track, the labor issue, which was never meant to be the center point
of NAFTA, became explosive. On one side, emotions aroused by the possible impact of NAFTA
on jobs and employment led to a focus on these issues as the major point of dispute and, therefore,
as one major cause of the failure of NAFTA. Indeed, leading legislators urged President Clinton to
abandon his quest for fast-track negotiating authority and instead launch a new campaign for
international labor standards.57
On the other side, resistance to linking trade liberalization, labor, and environmental
regulation has increased substantially. Many powerful interests in the United States and across the
NAFTA partnership feel that this linkage is a recipe for disaster. The Republicans in Congress said
that they would support fast track and the extension of NAFTA to Chile and through the Western
Hemisphere only if the labor and environment side agreements were dropped.
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